2021 Decisions

Opinions of the United
States Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit

3-5-2021

Allison Illes v. Commissioner Social Security

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021

Recommended Citation
"Allison Illes v. Commissioner Social Security" (2021). 2021 Decisions. 229.
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2021/229

This March is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in 2021 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law
Digital Repository.

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 20-1094
_____________
ALLISON R. ILLES,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER SOCIAL SECURITY
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
District Court No. 2-19-cv-04463
District Judge: The Honorable Susan D. Wigenton
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 21, 2020
Before: SMITH, Chief Judge, McKEE, and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 5, 2021)
_____________________
OPINION*
_____________________
SMITH, Chief Judge.

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does
not constitute binding precedent.

In 2007, Allison R. Illes sustained a serious C2-C3 spinal cord injury after
diving into a swimming pool. Her injury necessitated a C2-C3 anterior cervical
discectomy and spinal fusion. The surgery was successful. Nonetheless, in October
2008, based on anxiety related disorders that developed after her accident, Illes
applied for and was awarded disability benefits. In May 2013, she received notice
of a determination that her disability ceased as of that month. Illes disagreed and
pursued administrative review. Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge
(ALJ) upheld the determination that Illes’s disability had ended as of May 1, 2013.
Illes sought review by the Appeals Council. The Appeals Council vacated the
hearing decision and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether Illes
had become disabled at any time following the cessation of her disability on May 1,
2013. The Appeals Council also pointed out that the ALJ had failed to weigh the
medical opinion of Illes’s treating physician, Dr. Joseph Mejia, D.O. On remand,
the ALJ again concluded that Illes’s disability had ended on May 1, 2013 and further
determined that she had not become disabled for any period of time thereafter. Illes
sought judicial review before the District Court. After the District Court affirmed
the Commissioner’s decision, this timely appeal followed. 1

1

The District Court exercised jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g). We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
2

Illes asserts that the Commissioner’s decision is not supported by substantial
evidence. She contends that the District Court improperly evaluated the medical
evidence, erred by discounting the testimony of her father and sister regarding her
ability to perform activities of daily living, failed to provide the vocational expert
with an appropriate hypothetical, and erred in determining that she had the residual
functional capacity to perform other work in the national economy. To prove her
point that substantial evidence is lacking, Illes cites to numerous medical
assessments and reports, as well as the testimony of her father and sister.
Our review of the Commissioner’s final decision is “quite limited.”
Rutherford v. Barnhart, 399 F.3d 546, 552 (3d Cir. 2005). “[W]e must uphold a
final agency determination unless we find that it is not supported by substantial
evidence in the record.” Id. Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In conducting our review for substantial evidence, “we may not ‘weigh the evidence
or substitute [our own] conclusions for those of the fact-finder.’” Rutherford, 399
F.3d at 552 (quoting Williams v. Sullivan, 970 F.2d 1178, 1182 (3d Cir. 1992)). To
the extent we are presented with any legal issues, we exercise plenary review.
Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011).

3

There is no dispute that Illes suffered a serious injury in 2007. Fortunately,
that injury was not as devastating as it could have been. Illes continues to deal with
several medical issues and has certain limitations that affect her ability to perform
other work in the national economy. In Illes’s view, the ALJ failed to accord the
proper weight to the medical evidence and the testimony of her witnesses in
determining that she was capable of other work. We are not persuaded. We have
reviewed the extensive administrative record and scrutinized the ALJ’s careful
analysis of Illes’s claim of continuing disability.

We conclude that the ALJ

appropriately considered all of the evidence, explained the contradictions in the
evidence, and provided reasons for according more or less weight to the assessments
of various medical practitioners and the testimony of Illes’s father and sister. That
is exactly what is required under our jurisprudence. See Plummer v. Apfel, 186 F.3d
422, 429 (3d Cir. 1999). Having carefully evaluated the record, we conclude that
the ALJ provided a complete hypothetical to the vocational expert, incorporating
Illes’s non-exertional limitations. In sum, there is substantial evidence supporting
the ALJ’s decision and we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.
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